I have a book review of The Afghanistan Papers by Craig Whitlock up at Reason. For more context, see my collection of Afghanistan content. In it, I use the metaphor of “a big, dumb machine” to explain the war in Afghanistan, but I think it applies to American foreign policy more generally.
This is a good article. And raises the question of what, if anything, can be done to mitigate this problem. I won’t say “solve“ because that’s too much to ask for. It seems like focused executive authority that could compel different pieces of the machine to work harmoniously, or at least not to cross purposes, would work. Successful imperialists were able, in the past, to appoint viceroys or regional commanders that possessed sweeping executive authority. It will be very difficult for the American system to generate something like that. For example, in the 19th century, you had a similar mix of institutional and interest group efforts going on in India. Just as the American machine tried to impose contemporary liberal values on Afghanistan, the Victorian English public had a lot of people who wanted to do Christian missionary work in India. However, after the Sepoy Rebellion the regime refuse to permit that to continue, putting public order and military security ahead of proselytizing the Christian religion. In other words, imperialist ventures, like every large project, requires hard trade-offs. The Americans just tried to do everything all at the same time, without accountability. This means that every single time the United States takes on a project on this scale, or even much smaller scale, failure is inevitable, repeat: inevitable, due to the defects in the machinery. It’s a valuable insight. But, what is to be done? Fodder for your next article!
US Foreign Policy as a "Big, Dumb Machine"
The same political and bureaucratic machine has been giving the world Covid hysteria for two years, and the outcomes eventually will be similar.
Richard, Wasn't this in essence what Eisenhower warned about?
One of the best foreign policy books ever written.
Seems highly relevant to Arnold Kling’s Irrational Institutions seminar:
https://arnoldkling.substack.com/p/notes-from-first-seminar-meeting
This is a good article. And raises the question of what, if anything, can be done to mitigate this problem. I won’t say “solve“ because that’s too much to ask for. It seems like focused executive authority that could compel different pieces of the machine to work harmoniously, or at least not to cross purposes, would work. Successful imperialists were able, in the past, to appoint viceroys or regional commanders that possessed sweeping executive authority. It will be very difficult for the American system to generate something like that. For example, in the 19th century, you had a similar mix of institutional and interest group efforts going on in India. Just as the American machine tried to impose contemporary liberal values on Afghanistan, the Victorian English public had a lot of people who wanted to do Christian missionary work in India. However, after the Sepoy Rebellion the regime refuse to permit that to continue, putting public order and military security ahead of proselytizing the Christian religion. In other words, imperialist ventures, like every large project, requires hard trade-offs. The Americans just tried to do everything all at the same time, without accountability. This means that every single time the United States takes on a project on this scale, or even much smaller scale, failure is inevitable, repeat: inevitable, due to the defects in the machinery. It’s a valuable insight. But, what is to be done? Fodder for your next article!